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THE PARTS WE SKIP: A TAXONOMY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL IRRELEVANCY
Peter Beck*
I. A “VERSION” OF THE CONSTITUTION
On January 6, 2011, for the first time in the history of
Congress, the Constitution was read out loud on the House floor.1
“We hope,” said Rep. Bob Goodlatte, who organized the event,
“this will inspire many more Americans to read the
Constitution.”2 There are millions of pocket-sized Constitutions
in circulation; millions of Americans could have taken
Goodlatte’s advice and followed along in their copies of the text.3
Speaker of the House John Boehner began the reading: “We the
People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect
Union . . . .”4
In a show of bipartisanship, the reading alternated between
Republican and Democratic members. After Boehner finished
the Preamble, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi took over:
“All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . . . .” Then Rep. Cantor, “No
person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to
the age of twenty-five years and been seven years a citizen of the

* With thanks to Jill Hasday and the editors of Constitutional Commentary,
Meredith Foster, Akhil Amar, and, especially, Lizzy Beck.
1. Jennifer Steinhauer, Constitution Has Its Day (More or Less) in House, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/us/politics/07constitution.html.
2. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 112th CONG., READING OF THE CONSTITUTION
157, at H53–62 (COMM. PRINT 2011).
3. There are at least twenty million copies of two pocket editions of the Constitution
alone, printed by the National Center for Constitutional Studies and the Cato Institute.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, copyright page (National Center for
Constitutional Studies eds., 2nd ed. 2016) (“Over 16 million copies distributed.”); Cato
INSTITUTE,
Institute,
The
Cato
Pocket
Constitution,
CATO
https://store.cato.org/book/cato-pocket-constitution (“more than five million copies in
print.”).
4. READING OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2, at 53–54. All following quotes
from the congressional reading come from the Congressional Record.

223

1 - BECK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

224

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/11/19 6:34 PM

[Vol. 34:323

United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant
of that State in which he shall be chosen.” For those following
along at home, everything seemed all right. But then Rep. Cantor
continued: “The actual enumeration shall be made within three
Years . . . .” Even just listening to the reading, something sounded
off: “The actual enumeration . . .” What enumeration? For
readers following along, it was even more jarring. A whole
sentence had been skipped, as Rep. Cantor jumped from the
requirements for Representatives to the establishment of the
census. The missing sentence apportioned taxes and
Congressional representation according to state population,
“adding to the whole Number of free Persons . . . three fifths of
all other Persons.”5 The three-fifths compromise, included in the
Constitution to appease slave states during the Framing, must be
one of the most famous clauses in the document.6 Why had it been
skipped over?
The reading continued. Rep. Hoyer read the original number
of Representatives for each state; Rep. McCarthy read the
establishment of the Senate: “The Senate of the United State shall
be composed of two Senators from each State for six years.”
Again—something was wrong. This awkward-sounding sentence
was missing a whole clause after “each State”: “chosen by the
Legislature thereof.”7 Another missing phrase between Reps.
Rothman and Conaway (Senate recess appointments)8 and a
whole sentence gone between Reps. Poe and Weiner.9 Rep.
Keating read the clause enshrining the slave trade until 1808, and
Rep. Schiff read the Fugitive Slave Clause, but a whole paragraph
about the electoral system10 was cut between Reps. Payne and
Young, as was a paragraph about presidential succession11
between Reps. Pallone and Griffith. What was being kept in and
what was getting cut out? It was almost impossible to follow along.
Rep. Fortenberry read the second 1808 clause of the Constitution,
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
6. See, e.g., the extended discussion of the three-fifths clause in a typical and popular
high school U.S. History textbook, ERIC FONER, GIVE ME LIBERTY! 205-06, 234 (brief 4th
ed. 2014).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2. (“The Congress shall assemble at least once in every
Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall be law
appoint a different Day.”)
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
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Rep. Matsui read about Confederation debt—Rep. Hirono even
read the interlinear notes after Article VII, corrections from the
parchment copy: “The word ‘the’ being interlined between the
seventh and eight lines of the first page . . . .” Four
Representatives read the signatories, but only from New
Hampshire through Pennsylvania. By the time they got to
Delaware, the Representatives had moved on to reading the
rarely-encountered “Preamble” to the Bill of Rights. Part of the
Twelfth Amendment was skipped, but the Fourteenth
Amendment’s reference to voting rights for “male inhabitants . . .
twenty-one years of age” was included. Reps. Clarke and Ellmers
read about Confederate veterans and debt, but the Eighteenth
Amendment was skipped entirely. This led to even more
confusion when Rep. Platts read the Twenty-First Amendment:
“The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the
United States is hereby repealed.” The Representatives read the
ratification dates for the Nineteenth and the Twenty-First through
Twenty-Seventh Amendments, but only for those. Finally, after
Rep. Fincher finished the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, Rep.
Goodlatte concluded: “We have now completed the first reading
aloud of the United States Constitution.” Had they?
Rep. Goodlatte insists that they read (and have continued to
read in recent Congresses12) “the Constitution as it currently
operates.”13 In an email from his Communications Director,
Goodlatte elaborated: “Members read the version of the
Constitution printed by the Government Printing Office . . .
omitting those sections the GPO version brackets-off as
superseded . . . . They do not read inoperative clauses . . . .”14 It
might be a surprise to learn that there are versions of the

12. The latest—fourth—congressional reading of the Constitution took place on
January 5, 2017. As with earlier readings, the 115th Congress continued to skip parts of the
text. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 115th CONG., READING OF THE CONSTITUTION 163,
at H101–08 (COMM. PRINT 2017) (skipping, for instance, the Three-Fifths Clause and the
Eighteenth Amendment). The 116th Congress has yet to continue the Constitutionreading tradition. David Sherfinski, House Democrats Put off Rite of Reading Constitution
to Convene New Congress, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.washingtontimes.com
/news/2019/jan/8/house-democrats-put-rite-reading-constitution-conv/.
13. Philip Rucker & David A. Fahrenthold, After Wrangling, Constitution is Read on
House Floor, Minus Passages on Slavery, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/06/AR2011010602807.html.
14. E-mail from Beth Breeding, Commc’ns Dir. for Congressman Bob Goodlatte
(Apr. 10, 2017, 3:26 PM) (on file with author).
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Constitution in the first place. Immediately after the reading
concluded, the commentary began. Rep. Clyburn called the
editing of the Constitution “revisionist history,”15 a senior vice
president at the NAACP called it “sanitizing history,”16 and Rep.
Jackson inserted lengthy critical remarks into the Congressional
Record.17 Adam Serwer at the Washington Post argued that the
“superceded text” helps “remind us that the Constitution . . . was
not carved out of stone tablets by a finger of light,”18 while Adam
White at the Weekly Standard said that “to call the three-fifths
clause and other superseded provisions part of the current
‘Constitution’ is silly.”19 Jack Balkin blogged that reading the
whole Constitution would have been “a way of reminding
ourselves that the Constitution is always a work in progress,”20
and Matthew Franck at the National Review went further: “When
parts of [the Constitution] are amended, or even explicitly
repealed, they remain a part of the document . . . . They’re still
there, and in a true copy of the Constitution, should not only be
present, but should be unmarked by italics, brackets, or
asterisks.”21 But what is a true copy of the Constitution? One that
reflects all the provisions with legal force today—and only those
provisions? One that includes every word added to the
document—and not a single annotative word in addition? Or one
that includes all the words—and notes (or, online, hyperlinks) to
clarify what has been “superseded” or revised?
The text of the Constitution is short, and every word
matters—people notice when they are cut. But parts of this legal
document are indeed legally inoperative, some more obviously
than others. But which parts are they? Did Rep. Goodlatte pick
the right ones; can anyone? Should we be paying more attention
to these parts? How should we pay attention? Should they be
legally “operative,” in any sense?
Justice Scalia had a test for identifying plain meanings in
debated words: Could you “use the word in that sense at a cocktail
15. Rucker & Fahrenthold, supra note 13.
16. Rucker & Fahrenthold, supra note 13.
17. READING OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 2.
18. Tobin Harshaw, The Constitution, Sort Of, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Jan. 7,
2011),
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/the-constitution-sort-of/?_r=0
(compiling journalist and blogger reactions to the reading).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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party without having people look at you funny”?22 Similarly, the
rough test for which parts of the Constitution are really without
legal force today would be: Could you rely on that clause in a
court of law without having the judge look at you funny?
Sometimes the answer is obvious: you cannot rely on the
Eighteenth Amendment (Prohibition) in court. But other times
the answer is not so clear: Could you rely on the Preamble’s
guarantee of “the blessings of liberty”? Can you cite to the 1808
clauses, or use the ratification dates in an argument?
For such a short text,23 the number of frequently-skipped
clauses is striking. Rep. Goodlatte had his version of what should
be ignored; the academy has its version.24 Constitutional law
classes “have long had the same relation to the Constitution as the
Elgin Marbles have to the Parthenon,”25 writes Mary Ann
Glendon. “The student sees the professor’s prized collection of
fragments, but the well-proportioned structure in which these
treasures once had their appropriate place is nowhere on display.”
The Supreme Court has warned us against this kind of blinkered
approach to the document. Chief Justice Marshall declared in
Marbury v. Madison, “It cannot be presumed that any clause in
the constitution is intended to be without effect . . . .”26 Or in
Sturges v. Crowninshield: “[E]very word and sentence was the
subject of critical examination, and great deliberation.”27 And in
Holmes v. Jennison: “[N]o word was unnecessarily used or
needlessly added . . . . No word . . . can be rejected as superfluous
or unmeaning . . . .”28
22. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. Akhil Amar’s America’s Unwritten Constitution refers to the document as a
“terse text” forty-seven times. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION passim (2015).
24. Here it is worth making clear that, as useful descriptions of constitutional clauses,
inoperative and ignored frequently overlap—but that is not always the case. Section 3 of
the Fourteenth Amendment is both legally inoperative today and frequently ignored. The
Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses are both operative and not ignored. Cases where
these adjectives might diverge include the Three-Fifths Clause or the Eighteenth
Amendment (Prohibition), which are legally inoperative today, but still frequently studied
or discussed. Or the Bill of Attainder and Letters of Marque and Reprisal Clauses, which
are both legally operative, but basically ignored today. Generally, the focus of this Article
is on inoperative clauses (skipped by the Congressional readers, skipped by lawyers and
judges, often skipped by scholars), though most of them are also ignored.
25. Mary Ann Glendon, Comment in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 111 (1997).
26. 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).
27. 17 U.S. 122, 133 (1819).
28. 39 U.S. 540, 570–71 (1840).
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Even if there are parts of the Constitution without legal
force, they should not be ignored. At minimum, we should study
them to know where they are—and not just take Rep. Goodlatte’s
word for which parts are operative and which are not. Every year,
thousands of students and citizens encounter the Constitution for
the first time—they need to be told which parts are still in force
and which are not. But furthermore, they should be studied
because maybe they are not entirely inoperative, after all. Maybe,
in a laconic document like the Constitution, even phrases without
legal force can be rich with meaning and utility. “The document is
short,” writes David Strauss. “[E]ven shorter than it appears, if we
leave out provisions that are never invoked today . . . .”29 But “we
are in a better position to use the text as common ground if we
can say that the whole Constitution is binding than we are if we
routinely disregard parts of the Constitution and try to insist that
only certain clauses are binding.”30
To study these routinely disregarded parts, we must first,
then, identify them. But then we must also categorize them.
Otherwise we are left with “an arbitrary list, like random items on
the menu of an eclectic restaurant.”31 Taxonomies help us “think
intelligently about law.”32 If we can sort all the ignored provisions
of the Constitution into categories—a taxonomy of irrelevancy—
then we can see which, if any, might still be useful to us today.
Almost every clause that lacks legal force today can fit into
one of four categories. The first is the category the House reading
tried to identify: provisions that have been amended—repealed or
revised by later additions to the Constitution. The second did not
make the House’s cut-list, but may have as little legal force as
amended items: lapsed clauses—clauses that have sunset through
time or changed circumstances. The third is borrowed from
literary theory: paratext,33 all the bits and pieces of text and style
in and around the main text, which frame its reading or
interpretation (introductions, titles, dates, formatting, etc.). The
fourth category contains all the clauses that have been minimized,
typically by judges but sometimes by other constitutional actors
29. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 7 (2010).
30. Id. at 111.
31. Tim Kaye, A Sound Taxonomy of Remedies, 36 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 79, 84
(2017).
32. Emily Sherwin, Legal Taxonomy, 15 LEGAL THEORY 25, 25 (2009).
33. See GERARD GENETTE, PARATEXTS: THRESHOLDS OF INTERPRETATION (Jane
E. Lewin trans., 1997).
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(the President, Congress)—clauses that might have held legal
force (and might yet again) but for their narrow readings. These
categories—amended, lapsed, paratext, and minimized—should
be comprehensive. Scholars and citizens will continue to argue
over which phrases fit into which categories, but all the clauses
that might be inoperative should fit into at least one.
Furthermore, like Philip Bobbitt’s typology of constitutional
argument,34 this typology of constitutional irrelevancy serves
more than just an organizational function. Each kind of
irrelevancy is different—each has different implications for how
the clauses should be studied, what force (interpretive, if not
legal) they should have, and what might happen to them in the
future.
Returning to Mary Ann Glendon’s Parthenon metaphor
might be helpful. Her argument for studying the whole building
as opposed to just the prized fragments is an argument for holism:
for studying the Constitution as a complete document, not as a
collection of citable clauses. But even the holistic approach misses
out on a focused approach to the supposedly irrelevant pieces. To
study the Constitution—or the Parthenon—comprehensively,
you need to study every element. Part of the history of the
Parthenon is the fact that for a while, it was a mosque—Islamic
minarets came up and went down over its long history. These are
the amended parts of the building. Over centuries of construction
and reconstruction, columns which once held weight are no longer
actually serving a function, though they remain part of the
structure. These are the lapsed parts of the building. There is
visitor information—placards, posters, guides—all around the
Parthenon; how you view it is inevitably shaped by these
elements, though not literally part of the structure. This is the
paratext surrounding the building. And finally, later
preservationists and politicians have kept the building in a pristine
white condition—even though it was probably brightly-painted in
ancient times.35 This is how aspects of the building were
minimized. You can study the building as a whole, or study the
Elgin Marbles in isolation—but if you ignore all the other
34. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 3–8 (1982) (outlining a “Typology of
Constitutional Arguments”: historical, textual, structural, prudential, and doctrinal—and
later in the text adding “ethical” to the list).
35. Chris Irvine, Parthenon Was Covered in Colourful Paint, TELEGRAPH, May 18,
2017,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/5560715/Parthenonwas-covered-in-colourful-paint.html.
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fragments and pieces, the parts you were told do not matter, the
parts you thought you could skip—you would be missing
something important.
Two final notes before examining each of the four categories
of constitutional irrelevancy. First, the Supreme Court cannot
help us here. If the one thing these clauses have in common is that
they are without legal force today, then they will not—by
definition—usually form the basis of a justiciable case or
controversy. Perhaps they might be glanced at in dicta, but we are
unlikely to ever have a holding that articulates the meaning and
use of the Confederate Debt Clause, or state legislature elections
of Senators. The important exception is for minimized clauses:
what the Court has done, the Court can undo, and a minimized
clause might very well be brought back to life.
Second: why are there legally inoperative phrases in a legal
document, anyway? After all, the states typically edit their
constitutions when they amend them;36 why does the U.S.
Constitution just keep growing? As it turns out, there was nothing
inevitable about the expanding-list style of the Constitution.
James Madison, as part of the first Congress, suggested that the
first amendments be interwoven into the text—he even had
locations picked out for each one.37 He was outvoted by
supporters of Roger Sherman’s proposal: that the amendments be
tacked on lest the “whole fabric”38 of the document be destroyed.
“We might as well endeavor to mix brass, iron and clay, as to
incorporate such heterogeneous articles,” Sherman argued.
Madison disagreed—foreshadowing the exact problem that
would later result in the criticism of Congress’s edited reading:
“[I]t will be difficult to ascertain to what parts of the instrument
the amendments particular refer,” he wrote. “[T]he question will
often arise and sometimes not be easily solved, how far the
original text is or is not necessarily superceded, by the
supplemental act.”39
One scholar has suggested that Madison’s decision to give in
to Sherman’s argument rested on as historically contingent a fact
as that the summer was incredibly hot in 1789, and the
36. AMAR, supra note 23, at 468.
37. Edward Hartnett, A ‘Uniform and Entire’ Constitution; or, What if Madison Had
Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 252 (1997).
38. Id. at 253.
39. Id. at 254, 258.
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Representatives were restless.40 Perhaps we owe the
“archaeological feel”41 of the amended-not-edited Constitution to
a heat wave. In any case, that same scholar, Edward Hartnett,
tried to recreate Madison’s “Uniform and Entire” Constitution,
by interweaving the twenty-seven amendments to the
Constitution into the body of the text, and by deleting the parts
that had been superseded.42 Perhaps not surprisingly, the result of
this effort to create a Constitution as it operates today looks very
different from Rep. Goodlatte’s efforts at the same project.
Which parts really are irrelevant, and what we are supposed to do
with them, turn out to be hard questions, after all.
II. AMENDED
The House reading of the Constitution attempted to edit out
what had been amended.43 They left in all the other forms of
legally force-less elements: the lapsed parts (Rep. Israel reading
about Confederate debt obligations)44, the paratext (Rep. Fincher
letting us know when the Twenty-Seventh Amendment was
proposed and ratified)45, and the minimized parts (Rep. Rigell
reading the “privileges or immunities” clause46).47 To be fair, the
parts that have been amended make up the most obvious category
of constitutional irrelevancy. But what is not obvious is the full
extent of what should be included in this category, what tools are
most useful in analyzing amended clauses, and what interpretative
force or guidance we can draw from them.
Each of the categories of irrelevancy can be further divided
into two types: amended provisions, for instance, can either have
been amended directly or indirectly. Direct amendment happens
when a later provision (e.g. the Twenty-First Amendment)
explicitly refers to the part that it is revising (e.g. the Eighteenth
40. Id. at 256–58.
41. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 292, note (1998).
42. Hartnett, supra note 37, at 284–99.
43. Breeding, supra note 14 (“Members read the Constitution as amended.”).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
45. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 2, at H61 (“Amendment 27, originally
proposed September 25, 1789; ratified May 7, 1992”).
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
47. Accepting, for the moment, David Strauss’s argument that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause has indeed been minimized into irrelevancy: “[I]t is hard to say that a
position that has been consistently and explicitly rejected by the courts is still the law.”
David A. Strauss, Not Unwritten After All?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1551 (reviewing
AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (2015)).
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Amendment). Or when a later provision directly revises an earlier
part of the Constitution (even without referring to it by name—as
when the Twelfth and then the Twentieth Amendments revised
the Article II system for presidential election). Indirect, or
implicit, amendment requires an extra step: for instance, the
amendment changes something which then affects an earlier
provision.48 An example might be the Three-Fifths Clause itself.
The Thirteenth Amendment did not change the Apportionment
Clause of Article I—it abolished slavery, which left no one to be
counted as three-fifths. These implicit amendments—or implied
repeals—make the exact boundaries of the amended category
controversial. One of the reasons Congress’s edited Constitution
did not match Edward Hartnett’s edited Constitution is that
legitimate disagreements over the existence or extent of implicit
amendments can—and do—exist. That, again, was precisely
Madison’s fear regarding an amended (not edited) document.
But in any case, what is to be done with implicitly or explicitly
amended clauses, once we identify them? How should they be
read or used? One sensible approach—here and for all the parts
we skip—would be to analyze these clauses in the same way we
analyze the operative parts of the Constitution. That is, we could
apply the standard tools of constitutional interpretation or
argumentation to these clauses, and see what—if anything—
results. Philip Bobbitt’s six modalities of constitutional
interpretation are probably the most famous of these tools, but we
could use any such list.49 We could use Jack Balkin’s recently
48. There is, however, a canon of statutory interpretation suggesting a presumption
against “implied repeals.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION,
AND INTERPRETATION 568 (2014) (describing “The Presumption Against Implied
Repeals”); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (“In the absence of some
affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal
by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable”) (citing Georgia v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456–457 (1945)). Justice Scalia argued that this canon
should apply even more forcefully to constitutional interpretation. See Antonin Scalia,
Response in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 141 (1997) (“If the
Constitution, intended to be a more permanent document, should be treated at all
differently [from statutes] insofar as amendments are concerned, one would think that, if
anything, the normal rule of construction that repeals by implication are disfavored would
be more rigorously applied.”) (citing Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503–05
(1936)). But see Akhil Amar, Introduction to ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION (forthcoming ed.) (arguing that the Constitution has “no detailed
instructions about how extensively to reinterpret earlier clauses in light of later
amendments. Nowhere does the intergenerational text itself say that ‘repeals by
implication are disfavored’ or anything close to that”).
49. BOBBITT, supra note 34.
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proposed eleven topoi instead, for instance.50 His topoi, or
topics—like Bobbitt’s modalities—are simply “shared tools for
solving problems and inventing persuasive arguments.”51 Can we
use the standard tools of constitutional argument to solve the
problem of supposedly-skippable clauses? Can we use these tools
to invent persuasive arguments about what those clauses can do?
Some of the best tools for analyzing the amended clauses are
probably the structural, historical, and ethical modalities. Each of
these modalities is particularly well-suited to squeezing meaning
or interpretive force out of parts of the document that have been
specifically rejected or revised. Together, they ask: how has the
document (and the country) reshaped itself? How has it evolved?
What commitments or practices have we abandoned; what
projects have we repeatedly returned to? The final chapters of
Akhil Amar’s America’s Constitution: A Biography52 and
America’s Unwritten Constitution53 both engage in this exercise.
They look for trends in the amendments, evidence of what kinds
of clauses have been repealed over the course of American
history. This is a historical project (telling the story of America
and the Constitution through its amendments), a structural
project (revealing, for instance, the ways in which individual rights
have expanded, or how the country has shifted from federalism
towards nationalism), and an ethical project (trying to understand
the American project through the topics “We” keep coming back
to). Needless to say, none of this rich material would exist if the
Constitution simply edited out the amended parts. While each
amended item on its own might not have serious interpretative
force, and none of them have any legal force, together they tell an
impressive tale: there are significant themes, American leitmotifs,
in the collected amended clauses.
Another way to read the amended parts is intertextually, in
the same way we look to the Articles of Confederation or colonial
constitutions for interpretive guidance. Those charters, just like
the amended parts of the Constitution, were rejected. But
examining these early drafts in American constitutionalism helps
50. Jack M. Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution: The Topics in Constitutional
Interpretation, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 145 (2018) (proposing text, structure, purpose,
consequences, judicial precedent, customs, natural law or rights, national ethos, political
tradition, and honored authority as the eleven tools of constitutional argumentation).
51. Id. at 89.
52. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 458–63 (2005).
53. AMAR, supra note 23, at 449–77.
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us understand the current document. How can the powers given
to the Confederation’s Congress help us understand the powers
given to the Constitution’s Congress? How can the state bills of
rights help us understand the scope of the federal Bill of Rights?
These are intertextual questions, and they can be asked as
fruitfully of the amended clauses as they can of these outside-theConstitution texts. Should the amendment of the Three-Fifths
and Fugitive Slave clauses guide our reading of the Equal
Protection Clause? Should the revisions of the election methods
for Senators and Presidents guide our understanding of current
voting schemes? Should the expanding classes of people who can
vote for (and run for) President guide our understanding of
current voting rights issues or case law? Perhaps these are really
intra- not inter-textual questions.54 But that hinges on whether
you consider the amended parts to be part of our Constitution or
not, which citizens, scholars, lawyers, judges, and politicians can
and clearly do disagree on.
A final method for reading the amended clauses is through
the theory of the anticanon.55 The anticanon typically describes
the constitutional law cases most reviled or rejected today: Dred
Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Korematsu, for example.56 They are
“paradigmatic examples of what is not the law . . . . They inhabit
the same level of symbolic importance as Marbury and
McCulloch, but are cautionary tales rather than heroic ones.”57
Perhaps, then, the amended portions of the Constitution can be
read in a similar way: just as important (symbolically) as the rest
of the text, but as paradigmatic examples of what the Constitution
is not.
Towards the project of a comprehensive list of constitutional
irrelevancy, here, then, are the clauses that might fit in this
category, with a few notes on how some of them have been or
could be interpreted or used:

54.
55.
(1998).
56.
57.

See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).
Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243
Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011).
Primus, supra note 55, at 245.
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Table 1. The Amended Constitution
Clause

Amended By

Possible Uses

Article I, Section 2, Clause
iii: “three fifths of all other
Persons”

Indirectly
amended by the
Thirteenth
Amendment, then
directly amended
by Section Two of
the Fourteenth
Amendment

Anticanonical force,
guided by historical and
ethical arguments. The
Constitution (and the
country) repudiates its
slavocratic origins and
celebrates its abolitionist
reconstruction.

Article IV, Section 2,
Clause iii: “No Person held
to Service or Labour in one
State”

Directly amended
by the Thirteenth
Amendment

Same as above.

Article I, Section 3, Clause
i: “chosen by the Legislature”

Directly amended
by the Seventeenth Amendment

Structural and ethical
arguments: the Constitution has moved from a
more state-focused, federalist structure to a
more nationalist selfconception.

Article I, Section 3, Clause
ii: “if Vacancies happen . . .
during the Recess of the
Legislature”

Directly amended
by the Seventeenth Amendment

Same as above.

Article I, Section 4, Clause
ii: “first Monday in December”

Directly amended
by the Twentieth
Amendment

Article I, Section 9, Clause
iv: “No Capitation, or other
direct, Tax”

Directly amended
by the Twentieth
Amendment

Article II, Section 1, Clause
iii “The Electors”

Directly amended
by the Twelfth
Amendment

Structural and historical
arguments—the presidential election and succession systems are
deeply flawed. They require constant tinkering.
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Article II, Section 1, Clause
vi: “In case of the Removal
of the President”

Directly amended
by the TwentyFifth Amendment

Same as above.

The Twelfth Amendment

Directly amended
by the Twentieth
Amendment

Same as above.

Article III, Section 2,
Clause i “between a State
and Citizens of another
State”

Directly amended
by the Eleventh
Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment, Section 2: “male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of
age”

Indirectly
amended by the
Nineteenth and
Twenty-Sixth
Amendments

The Eighteenth Amendment

Directly amended
by the TwentyFirst Amendment

The franchise has only
grown throughout
American history, representing an expanding
American conception of
who is included in “We
the People.”58

III. LAPSED
Lapsed clauses are those which had legal force, but do not
any longer—though they were never amended or repealed. They
come in two types: clauses which have lapsed through time (sunset
provisions) or through changed circumstances (the original
conditions the clause refers to have disappeared). Sunset
provisions are more obvious—when the document refers to a
clause only having force until 1808,59 or requiring ratification
“within seven years,”60 it is clear that in 1809, or seven years after
the amendment was proposed, that clause has no more legal force.
Changed-circumstance lapsed clauses are more interesting: what
conditions in America have changed permanently? An example
might be Article VI, Section 1, Clause i: “All Debts contracted
58. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 52, at 461. For the argument that the Nineteenth and
Twenty-Sixth Amendments indirectly amended the Fourteenth Amendment, see AMAR,
supra note 23, at 188. For the argument that the Nineteenth Amendment implicitly
amended Article II and the Twelfth Amendment (women could now vote for, serve as an
Elector for, and run for President) see id. at 287–88.
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.; U.S. CONST. art. V.
60. U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII, § 3; XX, § 6; XXI, § 3; XXII § 2.
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and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this
Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this
Constitution, as under the Confederation.” No amendment ever
repealed this clause of the Constitution, and it does not have a
time-based sunset provision. But, as the United States paid off its
obligations under the Articles of Confederation, the clause
eventually lapsed. It refers to a condition—outstanding
Confederation debt—that no longer exists, and never will again.
Unlike the amended clauses, lapsed clauses therefore have a
vestigial quality to them. Clauses that were amended have been—
at least during one other point in American history—on the
forefront of political conversation; an Article V supermajority
decided to change them. Lapsed clauses simply stopped doing
anything (legally) on their own; they petered out. It is hard to
imagine a lapsed clause ever becoming a high-salience enough
political issue to prompt an Article V amendment. As a result,
they pose an interpretive puzzle: these clauses have never been
repudiated, but they probably never will be. How much attention
should we give them?
The answer is probably more than they have received; the
lapsed clauses seem particularly under-theorized in constitutional
scholarship. Luckily, there are existing constitutional interpretive
theories which seem applicable to the lapsed-clause category. In
terms of the constitutional modalities, textual and structural
arguments seem best-suited to unpacking lapsed clauses, as does
their close cousin, the intratextual method. In addition, the
historical modality works well here, especially as applied through
Jed Rubenfeld’s “Paradigm Case” model61 and Jack Balkin’s
“Original Expected Application” model.62
The intratextualism method allows “the interpreter . . . to
read a contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution
in light of another passage in the Constitution featuring the same
(or a very similar) word or phrase.”63 This, at a minimum, seems
like a good use for lapsed clauses. They may not be any more
Confederation debt,64 or Confederacy debt,65 but there is still U.S.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 16–17 (2005).
JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 6–20 (2011).
Amar, supra note 54, at 748.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
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national debt66—and it can still be a contested constitutional
issue.67 Why not read the Constitution’s use and understanding of
(still legally relevant) debt against its use of the exact same word
in other (no longer legally relevant) parts of the document?
Intratextualism “takes seriously the document as a whole rather
than as a jumbled grab bag of assorted clauses.”68 A taxonomy of
constitutional irrelevancy has the same mission, and the two
projects can serve each other.
A more radical use of the lapsed clauses would be to draw
from them substantive interpretative conclusions about the
Constitution and its principles. The Constitution deals with
Confederate soldiers, repudiates Confederate debt, and refuses to
compensate slave-owners after emancipation.69 All of these
clauses have lapsed; they do not and cannot apply to anyone alive
today. But perhaps we can draw from them a constitutional
principle, a commitment to the cause of union and freedom—and
a concomitant rejection of all the Confederacy stood for. “The
Lost Cause”—and relics of Confederate memory—still haunt this
country;70 is there a constitutional principle specifically rejecting
the Southern cause built into these lapsed clauses?71
This line of questioning is a sort of reverse-engineered
version of Rubenfeld’s Paradigm Cases, or Balkin’s Original
Expected Applications. To Rubenfeld, “[t]he point of
constitutional law is to hold the nation to its self-given,
fundamental commitments over time . . . .”72 The Constitution
often speaks in general principles, or commitments, and one way
we elucidate the meaning of those commitments is through the
“paradigm cases”—the core examples—underlying the principle.
66. Id.
67. Garrett Epps, Our National Debt ‘Shall Not Be Questioned,’ the Constitution
Says, ATLANTIC, May 4, 2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/05/ournational-debt-shall-not-be-questioned-the-constitution-says/238269/ (discussing the “debt
ceiling crisis” in terms of constitutional terms).
68. Amar, supra note 54, at 795.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 3, 4.
70. See, e.g., Sharlene Sinegal Decuir, Opinion, Good Riddance to Confederate
Monuments, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/opinion/
good-riddance-to-confederate-monuments.html?_r=0. See generally DAVID W. BLIGHT,
RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY (2002).
71. See Mark A. Graber, Teaching the Forgotten Fourteenth Amendment and the
Constitution of Memory, 62 ST. LOUIS L.J. 639, 645 (2019) (“[One] might put Section 3 to
creative use in debates over whether to maintain monuments to Confederate
notables . . . .”).
72. RUBENFELD, supra note 61, at 15.
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(For instance, the Equal Protection Clause through the Black
Codes). Lapsed clauses present us with the reverse situation: a
paradigm case, without a general commitment. Jack Balkin also
argues that the Constitution often speaks in broad principles,
applied to specific concerns. His “Living Originalism” demands
fidelity to the Original Meaning, if not to the Original
Application.73 But again, what if we only have an original
application (Confederate soldiers and debt) but no explicit
original principle? Should we infer the principle from the
application? Infer the commitment from the paradigm case?
There is a good argument from negative implication that the
framers of the Constitution or its amendments deliberately left
out the general commitment. Therefore, it would be destructive
to the text to infer a principle that was specifically left out. “[A]
negative-implication argument,” however, “should never be
decisive absent additional, fine-grained reasons to support its
application in a given situation.”74 Unless we have a historical or
structural or logical reason to assume that, for instance, the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment would reject a principle
against supporting the debt (read broadly) of a sectional, castebased cause, we should be able to read that principle into the text.
This principle would lend constitutional weight to arguments
against Confederate memorials or memorabilia.
This is not a watertight argument; generalizations from
paradigm cases never are: “Reasoning from paradigm cases is a
variegated business—incorporating considerations of text, policy,
and justice . . . . Paradigm cases do not dictate unique answers to
most constitutional questions.”75 Perhaps a less historically and
culturally loaded example might help clarify the “lapsed clause as
paradigm case” model. The Seventh Amendment requires juries
for civil trials when “the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars . . . .”76 The first Judiciary Act, almost contemporaneous
with the Seventh Amendment, established a financial minimum
for federal diversity jurisdiction at five hundred dollars77 (today it

73. BALKIN, supra note 62, at 12–14.
74. AMAR, supra note 23, at 538 n.1.
75. RUBENFELD, supra note 61, at 17.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
77. Establishment of the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1 Stat. 73, Chap. XX §
11 (1789).
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is $75,000).78 As a result, the Twenty Dollars Clause has never
been invoked, and indeed, it has rarely even been studied.
Not unusually for a lapsed clause, “no writer has analyzed the
Amendment’s [Twenty Dollar] clause,” and “many have not even
bothered to include the Twenty Dollars Clause when quoting the
Amendment . . . .”79 The Harvard Law Review Note that
attempted to remedy this situation ended up analyzing the
provision in precisely the “lapsed clause as paradigm case”
manner. Rather than write off the never-used, hardly-studied
clause as irrelevant, the author found a general principal in the
lapsed clause: the convergence of property and liberty in the
Framers’ philosophy. Twenty dollars represents “a de minimis
conception of property.”80 To the Framers, some amount of
property must be at stake for liberty to truly be at stake—and to
therefore require a liberty-protecting jury. It does not matter that
the amount-in-controversy requirement has always been set
higher than the constitutional minimum; “what’s important is that
the amount is not set at zero.”81 Whether you accept that author’s
conclusion (that the Twenty Dollars Clause constitutionally
embodies a Founding property-liberty philosophy), it is a nice
demonstration of how to argue with lapsed clauses.
Better, perhaps, than arguing only from lapsed clauses would
be to use lapsed clauses in support of an argument based in more
typically-litigated clauses. Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry did
something like this in their 1996 defense of Romer v. Evans.82
They use the Bill of Attainder Clause—along with the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause—to elaborate a “Pariah Principle”
embodied in the Equal Protection Clause. That is, they press two
lesser-used clauses into service understanding a more frequently
litigated clause. Or, to return to the Twenty Dollar example.
Maybe that lapsed clause is not enough to litigate a propertyliberty connection embodied in the Constitution. But in an
eminent domain or asset-forfeiture case, perhaps an invocation of
the Constitution’s liberty-property principle (see the lapsed
Twenty Dollar Clause) could be of service.83
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012).
79. Note, The Twenty Dollars Clause, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1665, 1665–66 (2005).
80. Id. at 1685.
81. Id.
82. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT.
257 (1996).
83. In this way, lapsed-clause arguments could perhaps work as interpretive

1 - BECK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

THE PARTS WE SKIP

7/11/19 6:34 PM

241

A final question from this category: what about clauses like
the Third Amendment, which have never been amended but have
also never really been used in court?84 These clauses may seem
vestigial, like lapsed clauses, but they differ significantly. The
Third Amendment can and will have legal force if the
circumstances it refers to—quartering soldiers—ever arise.
(Witness the late-blooming career of the Emoluments Clause, for
example.85) They are “dormant,” more than they are “lapsed.”
Lapsed clauses are those on which time or history has closed the
door for good. Some clauses may walk the line between dormant
and lapsed: they depend on the interpreter’s predictions about the
future. If the interpreter is convinced that soldiers will never be
quartered in American homes, then the Third Amendment would
indeed be lapsed, not dormant. Another edge case might be the
convention mechanism of Article V—it has never been used, and
maybe it never will be, but could it? A final clause that seems
lapsed but is not: Article I, Section 3, Clause ii, dividing the first
group of Senators into three classes, two of which did not get sixyear terms. While at first it would seem like this clause lapsed after
the third Congress, “the Senate has in every instance of a new
state’s admission followed a practice . . . [in which] senators from
new states have served initial terms of less than six years . . . .” 86
An attempt at a comprehensive list of clauses that are lapsed
might include the following:

“tiebreakers,” or presumptions, rather than determinative arguments on their own. See
generally Adam M. Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 77 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 1661 (2010).
84. The closest the Third Amendment has ever gotten to the Supreme Court was
Engblom v. Carey, 724 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1982). See also ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE
KENNEDY, IN OUR DEFENSE 107 (1991) (“Between one of the most controversial
amendments, the Second, and one of the most heavily litigated, the Fourth, is the forgotten
amendment.”). See also Graber, supra note 71, at 20 (describing the Third Amendment—
as well as Congress’s power to grant letters of marque and reprisal—as “anachronisms”
and part of his “Constitution of Memory”).
85. D.C. & Maryland v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-01596 (pending). In other words, the
clauses analyzed in this Article are all without legal force, not just unused. Conventionally,
a lawyer or judge cannot use an amended clause, a lapsed clause, a minimized clause
(without advocating for a change in doctrine), or paratext. Dormant clauses—like the
Emoluments Clause—are more like Justice Jackson’s “loaded weapon,” which “lies
about” waiting for a “plausible claim” to fit. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 213, 246
(1944) (Jackson, J., concurring).
86. AMAR, supra note 23, at 350.
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Table 2. The Lapsed Constitution
Clause

Notes

Article 1, Section 2, Clause iii: “The
Number of Representatives shall not
exceed one for every thirty Thousand”

Is this clause lapsed or dormant? It
depends whether you believe it is
ever conceivable that the House
could swell to its constitutional maximum, which today would be more
than 10,000 Representatives.

Article I, Section 2, Clause iii “the
State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts
eight, Rhode-Island . . .”

Lapsed after the first census and resulting reapportionment.

Article I, Section 9, Clause i: “prior to
the Year one thousand eight hundred
and eight”

Illustrating the constitutional use of
sunset (lapsed-by-time) provisions.87

Article V, Section 1, Clause i: “no
Amendment which may be made prior
to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight”

Same as above.

Article II, Section 1, Clause v: “No
Person except a natural born Citizen,
or a Citizen of the United States at the
time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of
President . . . .” (emphasis added)

This clause would have lapsed when
the last citizen-child from 1789, who
had not been a citizen at birth,
passed away, perhaps some time in
the late 1800s.

The Seventeenth Amendment: “shall
not . . . affect the election or term of
any Senator chosen before it becomes
valid”

Lapsed one full Senate
term after ratification.

87. Sunset provisions being common in legislation, occasional in the Constitution,
and rare in judicial doctrine (as in Grutter’s famous “twenty-five year” sunset provision).
For more on this topic—especially jurisprudential sunsets, see David Schraub,
DOCTRINAL SUNSETS (2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3317213 (“[T]he
United States’ constitutional text contains several sunset provisions . . . [y]et scholars have
not systematically explored the utility of incorporating sunset clauses into constitutional
or judicial doctrine.”).
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Lapsed after Harry S. Truman left
office. This clause, along with the
Seventeenth Amendment and Art.
II, § 1, cl. 5, above, all make exceptions for people who may have had
or relied on pre-rule expectations of
presidential, congressional, or termlimit eligibility. These lapsed clauses
are perhaps paradigmatic cases for
an unspoken constitutional principle
analogous to criminal law’s presumption against retroactivity. Constitutional rules should be read to
apply going forward, only. Or: the
Constitution is sensitive to reliance
interests.

Article VI, Section 1, Clause i: “All
Debts contracted . . . before the Adoption of this Constitution”
Article VII, Section 1, Clause i: “The
Ratification of the Conventions of
nine States”

Lapsed once the Constitution was
ratified. Lapsed clauses can signal
or highlight especially significant
historical political moments or processes.88 This lapsed clause is a reminder to pay attention to the (remarkable) ratification process to
understand the Constitution better.89

The Seventh Amendment: “twenty
dollars”
The Fourteenth Amendment, Section
3: “engaged in insurrection or rebellion”

Lapsed after the death of the last
Confederate veteran or supporter.90
There is an argument to be made
that this section of the Fourteenth
Amendment is actually dormant,
not lapsed. It refers to “insurrection

88. See also Graber, supra note 71, at 11 (arguing Sections 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth
Amendment embodied a temporary political imperative: securing power for the
Republican party).
89. See AMAR, supra note 23, at 49-94.
90. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY (2002) (“The Reconstruction Congress focused not on § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment —which contains the clauses most relevant today, but on §§ 2 and 3, which
essentially expired within a few years.” [sic—sections 3 and 4 seem more applicable].).
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or rebellion,” not specifically the
Confederate rebellion of 1860-65.
Theoretically, if there were ever another insurrection or rebellion in
the United States, this section could
have legal force once more.91
The Eighteenth, Twentieth, TwentyFirst, and Twenty-Second Amendments: “This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified . .
. within seven years”
Twentieth Amendment, Section 5:
“shall take effect on the 15th day of
October following the ratification of
this article”

IV. PARATEXT
The literary theorist Gerard Genette coined the helpful term
paratext to refer to all the “devices and conventions, both within
and outside the book, that form part of the complex mediation
between book, author, publisher, and reader: titles, forewords,
epigraphs,” and the like.92 These mechanisms for presenting or
explaining the text are not without impact. They are, in fact,
“Thresholds of Interpretation”93—the first items that shape our
understanding of a text. It is common to treat any text—perhaps
especially the Constitution— as “essential and unchanging,”
unaffected by the “insignificant container” that is its physical

91. Without seriously getting into the likelihood of this occurring, it is worth noting
that civil war is on some scholarly and artistic minds. See Sandy Levinson, Why Professor
Marcus’s Arguments Don’t Convince Me, BALKINIZATION, Mar. 30, 2017,
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/03/why-professor-marcuss-arguments-dont.html
(“I
think we are on the brink of civil war.”); see also Michiko Kakutani, A Haunting Debut
Looks Ahead to a Second American Civil War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/books/review-american-war-omar-el-akkad.html
(reviewing Omar El Akkad’s debut novel AMERICAN WAR, which “recounts what
happened during the Second American Civil War . . . It is a story that extrapolates the
deep, partisan divisions that already plague American politics”).
92. GENETTE, supra note 33, at front matter.
93. Id., at subtitle.
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presentation.94 But of course, “no text exists outside of the
support that enables it to be read; any comprehension of a writing
. . . depends on the forms in which it reaches its reader.”95 To move
from literary theory to legal scholarship: Jack Balkin has
elucidated the ways in which “the seemingly meaningless and
accidental features of a text possess an economy or logic that both
troubles and elucidates other features of the text.”96 His extended
treatment of a particular kind of paratext—the legal footnote—
demonstrates how the “surface features of the text . . . and the
meaning or argument or point of the text are not separable . . . .”
They “feed upon and nourish each other in a most uncanny
way.”97
Paratextual elements of the Constitution can be divided into
two groups: those that were included by the framers and ratifiers,
and those that are included by later editors and publishers.98
Examples of the first might include the Attestation and Signature
Clauses of the Constitution. Examples of the second might
include the footnotes and format (including size) of the
Constitution as published. Paratext almost certainly contains no
legal force—it is constitutionally irrelevant in that regard.
“[J]ustice should not be the handmaiden of grammar . . . .”99 Even
less so should justice be the handmaiden of typography. “For
almost all legal purposes, the variance of punctuation and
capitalization . . . should make no difference . . . . Sensible readers
should hesitate to place great weight on syntactical specks and
grammatical nits . . . .”100 Certainly; so why pay attention to the
size, the notes, the dates, or the formatting? Because they
influence how the document is read, and understood—and
ultimately that influences what it means. Unlike a typical statute,
the Constitution is a truly public document,101 and if the paratext
94. EVELYN B. TRIBBLE, MARGINS AND MARGINALITY 1 (1993).
95. Roger Chartier, Texts, Printing, Readings, in THE NEW CULTURAL HISTORY 161
(Lynn Hunt ed., 1989).
96. J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. L. REV. 275, 275 (1989).
97. Id.
98. Genette uses the term “official” to refer to the former category, and “unofficial”
or “semiofficial” for the latter. GENETTE, supra note 33, at 9–10.
99. ESKRIDGE, supra note 48, at 458 (quoting Value Oil Co. v. Irvington, 377 A.2d
1225, 1231 (N.J. Super. 1977)).
100. AMAR, supra note 23, at 68.
101. See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day (Sept. 17, 1937)
(“The Constitution of the United States was a layman’s document, not a lawyer’s contract.
That cannot be stressed too often.”).
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influences how the public interprets the Constitution, then the
constitutional paratext is worth studying.
Indeed, the public understanding of the document can trickle
into the scholarly and legal understanding of the document. David
Cole, legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, has
argued that constitutional change comes “from the ground up”
not “from the top down.”102 That is, from citizen-understandings,
not (or not only) from judges. Mark Tushnet, among others,103 has
described how popular understandings of the constitution’s
meaning can spread into political coalitions—and from political
coalitions to legal actors.104 Or they can even skip the political
parties, as when social movements directly influence legal
reasoning.105 The public encounters the document through the
filter of its paratext, and the publicly-encountered document
eventually does become the legally-relevant document.
In general, the textual modality is going to be the most
appropriate tool for paratextual analysis: what the text means is
influenced by what it looks like, what surrounds it. The historical
modality will also often be helpful—many of the Constitution’s
paratextual elements (the Framers’ signatures, the ratification
dates) are the most history-highlighting elements of the
document. Indeed, “historical awareness of the period which saw
the birth of a work is rarely a matter of indifference when reading
it.”106
This is especially true of the Constitution, which positions
itself as a multi-generational document grounded in American
history. When scholars like Akhil Amar examine the significance
of how “[e]ach discrete amendment bears a precise date that
102. David Cole, Engines of Liberty, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY BLOG
(Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.acslaw.org/?post_type=acsblog&p=11427.
103. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Legal Scholarship Symposium: The Scholarship of
Sanford Levinson: Idolatry and Faith: The Jurisprudence of Sanford Levinson, 38 TULSA
L. REV. 553, 567 (2003) (“the practice of politics can shift the boundaries of what is on the
wall and off the wall” in constitutional interpretation); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:
Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (2008).
104. Mark V. Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 991, 998 (2006).
105. Id. at 999 (“Judges observing the social movement . . . change their views about
what the Constitution means.”). But see See Ben Johnson & Logan Strother, Does the
Supreme
Court
Respond
to
Public
Opinion?
(Oct.
6,
2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3261668.
106. Gerard Genette, Introduction to the Paratext, 22:2 NEW LITERARY HISTORY 261,
256 (Marie Maclean trans., 1991).
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locates its message within the broader saga of American
history,”107 they are engaging in paratextual analysis. The
ratification dates for every amendment, included in almost every
edition of the Constitution, are not literally part of the
amendments’ text. (How could they be? The early ratifiers of each
amendment had no idea when the ratification would be
complete.) And yet that outside-the-text (paratextual)
information inevitably shapes one’s reading of the text—often
significantly: “[W]e need only see the date 1868 alongside the
Fourteenth Amendment to understand its underlying impulse.”108
The dates of the amendments are what tell the reader to think of
the first ten amendments as part of the Founding generation. To
see amendments thirteen through fifteen as part of America’s
Reconstruction. To recognize the triumphs (women’s suffrage)
and failures (Prohibition) or a particular, progressive era.
Arguments about the order, relative length, or placement of
clauses are also paratextual. “The textual order of the
Constitution’s first three articles made both conceptual and
democratic sense,” for instance.109 In other words, the fact that the
legislative article is “first,” or that the judicial article is “third”
should be read as democracy-affirming.110 A similar argument is
made by the refrain, “The First Amendment is first for a
reason”—repeated by politicians111 and journalists112 alike. Of
107. AMAR, supra note 52, at 459.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 208. See also Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671 (2002)
(making extended arguments about the Constitution’s meaning from its “size and shape”).
110. See, e.g., Press Release, Ben Sasse, Sasse on Kavanaugh Hearing: ‘We Can and
Should Do Better Than This’ (Sept. 4, 2018) (on file with author),
https://www.sasse.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/9/sasse-on-kavanaugh-hearing-wecan-and-we-should-do-better-than-this (“The Constitution’s drafters began with the
legislature. These are equal branches, but Article I comes first for a reason . . . .”). See also
AMAR, supra note 109, at 693 (drawing meaning from the fact that “the Constitution lists
the judiciary third among the three great departments”); RICHARD BEEMAN, THE
PENGUIN GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 47 (2010) (“Just as the framers
of the Constitution considered the Congress to be the most vital branch of the new
government and therefore dealt with that branch in the very first article of the
Constitution, so too was the placement of the judicial branch in Article III of the
Constitution a reflection of their view of the relative importance of that branch.”).
111. UNITED STATES SENATE, 104th Cong., HOUSING FOR OLDER PERSONS ACT 141,
S18063 (COMM PRINT 1995) (“the first amendment is first for a reason.”) (statement of
Sen. Bumpers); HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 110th Cong., FREE FLOW OF
INFORMATION ACT OF 2007 153, H11593 (“The first amendment is first for a reason.”)
(statement of Rep. Poe).
112. Ed Pilkington, New York Times’s Jill Abramson: ‘The First Amendment is First
for a Reason’, GUARDIAN, Oct. 13, 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/oct/13/
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course, the First Amendment is first rather than third only
because two of Madison’s proposed amendments were not
immediately ratified.113 Clearly, then, the “Firstness of the First
Amendment”114 argument is purely paratextual—reading
significance from an artifact of timing and formatting, not
intention or drafting.
The size, price, annotations, and headings in and around the
text also influence one’s reading—but here we run into a serious
problem: which edition of the Constitution should we look at?
While the core text does not typically vary from copy to copy, the
paratext can significantly. Editions of the Constitution vary in
size, in whether or how they include ratification dates, in whether
they include other documents around or within the Constitution
(the “Preamble” to the Bill of Rights, the Convention Resolution,
the Declaration of Independence), in whether they include
footnotes or annotations, in whether they include bracketed or
italicized text to indicate repeals or amendments, and much more.
To take just one example: the printed LexisNexis edition of
the Constitution—handed out free to future lawyers, judges, and
legal scholars—is full of content-influencing paratext. Each clause
is titled, such as Article I, Section 8, Clause 8: “Patents and
copyrights,” or Article III, Section 2, Clause 3: “Trial by jury.”
Those examples are relatively innocuous, but others can
significantly alter the text. For example, to call Article IV, Section
2, Clause 3 “Runaway slaves”—in the document—is to
specifically add a word to the Constitution that the Framers bent
over backwards to avoid. Their avoidance is historically and
structurally significant. Casually pulling back the curtain on those
efforts adds honesty and clarity to a text that was deliberately
being obscure or evasive. Or the Second Amendment, here titled
“Right to bear arms.” By selecting just that phrase from the
amendment to use as its heading, this edition takes sides in an
argument over the text’s meaning.115 (Thirty years ago it probably
new-york-times-jill-abramson-first-amendment.
113. Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, 1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 96 (1789) (listing what became the First Amendment as
“Art. III,” after amendments regarding representation and congressional compensation).
114. Edmond Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464 (1956).
115. Labelling the Second Amendment as “The Right to Bear Arms” does the same
kind of interpretive work as the National Rifle Association’s selective quoting of the
amendment in its headquarters. See, e.g., The Second’s Missing Half, MOTHER JONES
(Jan./Feb. 1994), available at https://www.motherjones.com/politics/1994/01/seconds-
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would have been titled “Militia rights.”) The Fourteenth
Amendment’s Section One is called “Citizens of the United
States.” Why not “Privileges or Immunities,” “Equal Protection,”
or “Due Process”? But all of these choices—these arguments—
are hidden, in paratext. Of course, the point here is not that a
lawyer would typically raise, in a constitutional dispute, a claim
based on the Second Amendment’s heading in the Lexis-printed
Constitution. Instead, by the time of that dispute, the paratext will
have already done its subtle work influencing how people read,
interpret, and understand the text.116
If we took constitutional paratext more seriously, we might
be more concerned about the variation across editions. If paratext
truly shapes the meaning of text, we might be as interested in a
“standardized” paratext for the Constitution as we are in a
standardized core text. In any case, a project that commits to
scrutinizing every single word of the Constitution as encountered
must engage with the document’s paratext.
For the Constitution, a comprehensive list of paratextual
elements might include:
Table 3. The Paratextual Constitution
Paratext

Notes

The size and order of each Article, section, or amendment.117
The Preamble.

The Preamble is debatably text
and not paratext. (Is it more like
the Articles or like the Attestation Clause and signatures? More
like the amendments or like the
letter from Congress introducing
the amendments?) In any case, it

missing-half/ (describing the wall-emblazoned quotation on the N.R.A.’s Washington,
D.C. headquarters, which omits the first, militia-related, half of the amendment).
116. Occasionally, however, headings or labels actually do perform dispositive
interpretative work in legal disputes. See, e.g., Daniel B. Listwa, Comment, Uncovering the
Codifier’s Canon: How Codification Informs Interpretation, 127 YALE L.J. 464 (2017)
(analyzing the significant weight placed on statute section captions by the Supreme Court
in Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. __ (2015)).
117. See discussion, infra, of arguments made from—for example—the fact that
Article I is “first,” and longest, or that the First Amendment is “first for a reason.”
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provides an excellent case study
in how to do paratextual analysis.
The Supreme Court and scholars
have insisted that the Preamble
contains no substantive legal
force, but have insisted just as
forcefully that it carries broad interpretative power.118
Article VII’s interlinear notes.

One of the oddest elements of the
Congressional reading of the
Constitution. The interlinear
notes are corrections to the handwritten parchment copy of the
Constitution. Since those corrections are inevitably worked into
any printed copy of the Constitution, it is not clear why—if actual
clauses of the document were going to be cut—these notes were
left in.

The Attestation Clause.

Whether the Attestation Clause is
text or paratext matters for the
debate over whether the phrase
“our Lord” is part of the enacted
Constitution or not.119 But
whether or not it is part of the legal text, it is certainly part of the
encountered text, and undoubtedly shapes people’s reading of
the document (and understanding
of the Framers).

The signatures.120

118. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905) (“Although the Preamble
indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and established to the
Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power.”); District
of Columbia v. Heller 554 U.S. 570, 578 n.3 (“[I]n America ‘the settled principle of law is
that the preamble cannot control the enacting part of the statute . . . .’”) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 146 (5th
ed. 1992)); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 218–21 (1833 abridged ed.) (“The importance of examining the preamble . . .
has been long felt . . . [but] [t]he preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers
confided to the general government.”); AMAR, supra note 47, at 5–53 (2005).
119. See AMAR, supra note 23 at 69–73 (2015).
120. Michael Coenen has written a comprehensive analysis of the signatures in the
Constitution. Michael Coenen, Note, The Significance of Signatures: Why the Framers
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Section headings like “Article I,”
“Article II,” and “Article III” are
paratextual elements that have
been used to locate the otherwiseunnamed principle of separation
of powers in the text.121 Describing the first ten amendments as
the “Bill of Rights” comes more
from the Reconstruction era than
the Founding.122 Should that popular bit of Reconstruction-era
paratext be used to support arguments for incorporation, or nineteenth-century understandings of
the rights of the people?

The Government Printing Office
edition, for example, includes the
Declaration of Independence in
their copy of the Constitution.
The best-selling ebook edition on
Amazon—to move outside the
realm of print-only—also includes
the Declaration of Independence,
bizarrely inserted between the
seven Articles of the Constitution
and the amendments.123

The dates of ratification.124
Signed the Constitution and What They Meant by Doing So, 119 YALE L.J. 966 (2010). He
argues that the signatures served a marketing function in the ratification debate, both by
advertising the illustrious figures behind its framing, and by binding those same figures
into supporting the document. Nevertheless, he argues that the signatures can have
interpretative force today, by highlighting the federalist nature of the document (the
signatures are organized by state); establishing its connection to the Revolution (the
reference to the twelfth year of an independent America); and by historicizing the
document, emphasizing (for better and for worse) its Framing and Framers.
121. Amar, supra note 109, at 691 (2002) (“What are the words ‘Article I,’ ‘Article II,’
and ‘Article III’ doing if not marking a separation?.”).
122. Akhil Amar has correctly observed “the federal Constitution does not contain a
separate section formally captioned as a ‘Bill of Rights’ . . . .” As part of the core, official
text, maybe—but the paratext is teeming with references to the “Bill of Rights.” It pops
up in almost every edition of the Constitution in print.
123. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2016).
124. See the discussion, infra, about the ratification dates historicizing effect on the
document.
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V. MINIMIZED
The minimized clauses of the Constitution have been
extensively studied, like many of the amended clauses, and unlike
the paratext or lapsed clauses. They are the clauses which have
been reduced, through constitutional interpretation or action, to
near-meaninglessness. They come in two types: minimization
through Supreme Court precedent and (perhaps less common)
through congressional or presidential action or inaction.
Minimized clauses are the bread-and-butter of constitutional law
casebooks, which demonstrate how the Constitution’s text has
been interpreted and reinterpreted over two hundred years of
Supreme Court cases.125 Unlike the other categories of
constitutional irrelevancy, minimized clauses are not remotely
obvious to the casual reader. In fact, they typically come as a
surprise, since the minimization process by definition distorts the
facial meaning of the text. “University professors who teach
constitutional law often neglect to assign the document itself,”
Akhil Amar has written. “The running joke is that reading the
thing would only confuse students.”126 It is perhaps an American,
or at least common-law, phenomenon: “[Civil lawyers] find it hard
to understand why constitutional law courses and material begin,
not with a study of the language and design of the Constitution,
but with a case,” Mary Ann Glendon writes. She recounts the
story of a student who asked about the role of the constitutional
text, to which the professor responded, “Forget about the text!”127
Amar and Glendon’s stories both illustrate the same point: some
(most?) of the constitutional clauses are not fully intelligible
without knowing the doctrine that surrounds them.
The best methods for analyzing minimized clauses are
probably doctrinal arguments (to discover the process of
minimization) and historical arguments (to discover what the
clause did, or should, mean). But actually finding—or agreeing
on—which clauses have been minimized is especially difficult.
125. See, e.g., MICHAEL STOKES PAULSON ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (2017) (including whole index sections for—along with dozens of cases
referencing—the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Contracts Clause, the Guarantee
Clause, and the Ninth Amendment, for example).
126. AMAR, supra note 52, at xi.
127. Glendon, supra note 25, at 107.
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Figuring out which clauses have been read out of existence runs
into a serious theoretical problem: calling something minimized
requires a background assumption about what the clause’s proper
scope should be. That is itself an act of interpretation—and a
contestable one at that. For example, until McDonald and Heller,
was the Second Amendment right to bear arms minimized (the
Court had been reading the right into irrelevancy), or did those
cases unduly maximize what until then had been properly read?128
Tangentially, however, the argument and opinions in McDonald
do provide us with what is probably the best example of a
minimized clause in the Constitution: the Privileges or Immunities
clause.129
Privileges or Immunities “play hardly any role in judicial
decisions interpreting the Constitution . . . .”130 This has been true
since the Slaughter-House Cases of 1873.131 Indeed, “SlaughterHouse stands for one simple truth: that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause is utterly incapable of performing any real
work . . . and that any argument premised on the Clause is
therefore a constitutional non-starter.”132 And yet, thanks to
originalist scholarship demonstrating the extent to which the
Fourteenth Amendment framers emphasized this clause, it is
“enjoying something of a renaissance among constitutional
scholars.”133 What has been minimized can be rehabilitated.134 Or,
as Akhil Amar has put it—quoting Billy Crystal’s character in the
Princess Bride—”There’s a big difference between mostly dead

128. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The Embarassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J.
637 (1989) (arguing that the then-pervasive lack of scholarly attention on the Second
Amendment was a mistake, and—in the article’s influence—demonstrating how a
minimized clause can be un-minimized).
129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
130. Strauss, supra note 47, at 1551.
131. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
132. Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporation Straight: A Reinterpretation of
the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 646 (2000).
133. Id.
134. The Equal Protection Clause may be another example of a revival from
minimized status. In Buck v. Bell, Justice Holmes described the clause as “the usual last
resort of constitutional arguments.” See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 274 (1927). In the 1940s,
scholars were still describing it as a “dubious weapon in the armory of judicial review”
after “eighty years of relative desuetude.” Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 341 (1949). The same word was used
to describe the clause in Bakke: “decades of relative desuetude.” Regents of Univ. of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978). Now, of course, Equal Protection is one of
the centerpieces of constitutional law and argumentation.
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and all dead.”135 Because of Slaughterhouse, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause is mostly dead; can it be revived?
Justice Scalia did not think so. In the McDonald oral
argument, he asked counsel for the petitioners why they had
suggested using Privileges or Immunities, rather than Due
Process, to incorporate the Second Amendment against the states.
“[W]hy are you asking us to overrule 150, 140 years of prior law .
. . when you can reach your result under substantive due—I mean,
you know, unless you’re bucking for a . . . place on some law
school faculty . . . .”136 Justice Thomas, however, strongly
disagreed. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas wrote that
the Second Amendment “applies to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.”137
He referred to the Court’s “marginalization”138 of the Clause, and
argued that “this case presents an opportunity to . . . begin the
process of restoring the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment .
. . .”139 More recently, Justice Thomas has found an ally on this
subject in Justice Gorsuch.140 But the debate is an old one. In 1935,
the Court struck down a Vermont tax law on—among other
grounds—the privileges or immunities clause, prompting a
strongly-worded dissent from Justice Stone: “Feeble indeed is an
attack on a statute,” he wrote, “which can gain any support from
the almost forgotten privileges and immunities clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”141 He continued: “Since the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment at least forty-four cases have been
brought to this Court in which state statutes have been assailed as
infringements of the privileges or immunities clause. Until today,
none has held that state legislation infringed that clause.”142
135. Interview with Akhil Amar, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University (Feb. 20,
2017).
136. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742
(2010) (No. 08-1521)
137. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 806 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
138. Id. at 809.
139. Id. at 813.
140. See Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. __ (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“the
appropriate vehicle for incorporation may well be the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges
or Immunities Clause.”). See also Ilya Shapiro & Josh Blackman, The Once and Future
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. (2019) (“a Supreme Court
majority willing to take the clause seriously” is “what it will take for a true rebirth of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause”).
141. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 443 (1935).
142. Id. at 445–46.
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The Fourteenth Amendment is an excellent case study in
minimized clauses, since there is now broad agreement that
Privileges or Immunities means more than it can be cited for, as a
result of judicial action. The disagreement is what to do about it:
restore Privileges or Immunities (Thomas, and maybe Gorsuch)
or accept Due Process incorporation and move on (the rest of the
Court). Indeed, to the extent that the Court recognizes and
regrets a “minimization,” it can either choose to restore that
minimized clause, or “maximize” another clause in compensation.
Perhaps this solves part of the problem, but it also makes the text
of the Constitution doubly-unintelligible.143 In other words, now
two clauses do not mean what they seem to say. That is arguably
what has happened between the Privileges or Immunities Clause
(minimized), and the Due Process Clause (maximized).144
Other examples of minimization are much more arguable,
and no other clause may have been quite so dramatically read out
of existence. Different citizens and scholars will feel that their pet
clause has been unfairly or unwisely diminished. But, as a
provisional gesture towards completing the taxonomy of
irrelevancy, which clauses have had good cases made for them as
being minimized?
Table 4. The Minimized Constitution
Clause

Arguments about minimization

The Declare War Clause.

Sanford Levinson, for example, has described
the way in which—in a single lifetime—Congress’s power to declare war has become “fundamentally irrelevant.”145

143. See, e.g. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME
COURT’S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS SOMETHING WE THE
PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND (1995).
144. See, e.g., CNN Transcript of Kavanaugh Supreme Court Hearing, CNN (Sept. 5,
2018), available at http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1809/05/cnr.08.html (“So I think
the Ninth Amendment and the privileges and immunities clause and the Supreme Court’s
doctrine of substantive due process are three roads that someone might take that all really
lead to the same destination under the precedent of the Supreme Court now . . . .”).
145. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2006) (“It is safe
to say that no president, of either political party, feels significantly constrained by the
Declare War Clause of Article I.”).
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The Contracts Clause.

James Ely has written that “the contract
clause is no longer the subject of much judicial solicitude or academic interest. Since the
1930s the once potent contract clause has
been largely relegated to the outer reaches of
constitutional law.”146 Justice Gorsuch
agrees—and indeed, may be looking to revive
the clause.147

The Guarantee Clause.

Senator Charles Sumner called the Constitution’s guarantee of republican forms of government in the states “the sleeping giant in
the Constitution.”148 It is still unenforced—or
minimized—by the Court, largely through
justiciability doctrines.149 As with other minimized clauses, though, the giant may yet
wake up.150

The Public Use Clause.

Justice Thomas has argued that decisions like
Kelo v. City of New London151 make up “a
string of cases construing the Public Use
Clause to be a virtual nullity, without the
slightest nod to its original meaning.”152

The Ninth Amendment.

Mitchell Gordon, in his article Getting to the
Bottom of the Ninth, has described the ways
in which “[f]ew courts have ever used it [the
Ninth Amendment] as the basis of a decision;
the U.S. Supreme Court has never done
so.”153 Among constitutional litigators, the

146. James Ely, Still in Exile? The Current Status of the Contract Clause, Vanderbilt
Law Research Paper No. 19-04 at 1 (2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3318590.
See also Citing later to Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 89091 (1987) (“the clause is now for the most part a dead letter.”); City of El Paso v. Simmons,
379 U.S. 497 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of using Home Building
& Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell to “practically read the Contract Clause out of the
Constitution”).
147. Sveen v. Melin, 584 U.S. __ (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“For much of its
history, this Court construed the Contracts Clause in this [strong] light. . . . More recently,
though, the Court has charted a different course. . . . [The modern] test seems hard to
square with the Constitution’s original public meaning.”).
148. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
149. Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. (2018).
150. Id. at 4 (“several scholars have predicted that the eventual demise of the political
question barrier to judicial enforcement of the Guarantee Clause is only a matter of
time.”).
151. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
152. Id. at 506.
153. Mitchell Gordon, Getting to the Bottom of the Ninth, 50 IND. L. REV. 421, 423

1 - BECK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

7/11/19 6:34 PM

THE PARTS WE SKIP

257

amendment is “all but imaginary,”154 and in
“sophisticated legal circles . . . mentioning the
Ninth Amendment is a surefire way to get a
laugh.”155
The Privileges or Immunities Clause.156
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Reapportionment
Clause.

Gerard N. Magliocca has argued that “the
current reapportionment process violates
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment,”157 but acknowledges that it has “never
been enforced”158 in a “century of neglect.”159

VI. THE VALUE OF THE PARTS WE SKIP
We—scholars, lawyers, judges, politicians, and citizens
generally—need to stop skipping the parts we skip. We need to
take seriously the oft-repeated assumption that every word in our
short Constitution matters.160 That is the fundamental project of
this Article. Either to validate that assumption—if every word
matters, let’s actually look at every word; or to reveal its
inaccuracy—every word doesn’t matter, after all. Having
identified and catalogued all the parts we skip, what have we
learned? Do all the words in the Constitution matter? Can they
all be used? What makes the ignored provisions different from the
enforced provisions, and what makes them different from each
other?
In the summer of 1787, James Madison worried about what
would become a lapsed clause of the Constitution. “So long a
(2017).
154. Id., at 424 (quoting Randy Barnett).
155. Id. (quoting John Hart Ely).
156. See discussion, supra.
157. Gerard N. Magliocca, Our Unconstitutional Reapportionment Process, 86 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 101, 102 (2018).
158. Id. at 110.
159. Id. at 105.
160. A sentiment expressed generally supra notes 26, 27, 28. This sentiment is also
addressed in each of the articles cited above to rehabilitate individual skipped parts of the
Constitution. See, e.g., Magliocca, supra note 157, at 105. (“[I]t is time to treat Section Two
of the Fourteenth Amendment with the respect due to a constitutional provision.”);
Gordon, supra note 153, at 425 (“[T]he Constitution contains no known exception under
which we may ignore provisions on the ground that they are tough to understand.”)
(referring to the Ninth Amendment).

1 - BECK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

258

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/11/19 6:34 PM

[Vol. 34:323

term,” he said to the Constitutional Convention, regarding the
1808 clauses, “will be more dishonorable to the National character
than to say nothing about it in the Constitution.”161 What is in the
Constitution matters—symbolically, historically—even when
those clauses have no legal impact anymore. That much should be
obvious from the strong reaction to the congressional reading of
the Constitution, and its elision past the inoperative Three-Fifths
Clause. To examine the historical and symbolic significance of the
parts we skip should be reason enough to study them. But this
Article goes further, showing the ways in which sections deemed
legally irrelevant might actually be useful for legal argumentation
after all. Indeed, while all four kinds of ignored provisions
currently lack legal force, they all offer some interpretative force.
The amended portions have anticanonical, or intertextual force;
the lapsed clauses have intratextual or paradigm case force; the
paratext has textual or historical force; and the minimized
portions have originalist (and dormant legal) force.
Mark Graber, and others, have lamented the ways in which
parts of the Fourteenth Amendment in particular have been
“forgotten.”162 Looking more closely at this amendment as an
example—with our specific categories of irrelevancy now in
mind—can help us analyze this “forgetting” in much clearer
detail. Section One’s Privileges or Immunities Clause has been
minimized. But minimized clauses can come back (its neighbor,
the Equal Protection Clause, is a case in point163). So too with
Section Two’s Reapportionment Clause—it was minimized, never
used—but it may yet have teeth. That clause’s limitation of the
reapportionment penalty, meanwhile, was amended—by the
Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments. In that amending we
can read a structural argument towards an ever-expanding base of
suffrage (male becomes male and female; eighteen becomes
twenty-one). The clauses of sections two, three, and four that have
to do with the Confederacy are lapsed. They specifically apply to
circumstances that have permanently changed, and—unlike the
minimized clauses—can never be legally enforced on their own.
But they can help us interpret other clauses (what the text means
by “debt”) or derive structural principles from the whole text
161. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
at 530 (1987 bicentennial edition).
162. Graber, supra note 71 (focusing on sections two through four).
163. Supra note 134.
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(against, for instance, the legacies of secession and slavery). The
whole amendment is the longest in the Constitution—a
paratextual argument about its primacy. But it’s also
“Fourteenth,” a paratextual argument against its significance (if
the First Amendment is first for a reason, is the Fourteenth
fourteenth for a reason?).164 Minimized, amended, lapsed,
paratext—each part is ignored for a different reason; each part
can be put to different use.
Part of this project has been descriptive, part has been
prescriptive. How can scholars or lawyers organize the ignored
parts of the Constitution—and how should we use them? In terms
of organization, the taxonomy can show us the relative frequency
of different categories of irrelevancy. Depending on how one
counts the paratext, most of the irrelevant clauses are lapsed—
even though the legal and political cultures probably focus more
on minimized or amended clauses. The taxonomy also reveals
who or what changes the Constitution. Amended clauses have
been changed by “We the People,” through Congress and the
states. Lapsed clauses have been changed by time or history.
Paratext has been changed by publishers and editors of the text.
And minimized clauses have been changed by (usually) the
judiciary. We may feel differently about each of those actors’ right
to tinker with the Constitution; the taxonomy helps us see who
has done what to which parts of the document. And the taxonomy
assembles and organizes what may have seemed to be
disconnected pieces of scholarship: Coenen on the signatures in
the Constitution, Amar on the Attestation Clause, Graber on the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the student note on the Twenty
Dollars Clause, for instance.
Going forward, there is work to be done in each category of
irrelevancy. Scholars, lawyers, politicians, and citizens generally
need to have a better understanding of which parts of the
164. Is there a paratextual change that could improve the reading, to highlight the
Fourteenth Amendment better? Growing up, I went to a grade school that had been
founded in 1628; there was a plaque on a wall listing every head of school since that
founding. One’s eyes could glaze over the list of unfamiliar names (Jan Stevensen, William
Verstius, Daniel Bratt . . .) until one got to a line break in between two heads of school,
and the striking note: “The School was interrupted by the Revolutionary War.” Imagine if
the amendments, listed one after another after another, suddenly reached a similarly
disruptive, truthful line break between amendments twelve and thirteen: “The United
States temporarily broke apart during the Civil War.” Imagine then how striking the
rightly-named Reconstruction Amendments would seem.
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Constitution truly have been amended—the congressional
reading and each of the printed and online editions disagree about
the amendments’ direct and indirect impacts. We need to stop
ignoring the lapsed clauses, and mine them more thoroughly for
meaning and guidance. We need to continue historical research
towards understanding—and then perhaps rehabilitating—
minimized clauses.165 And we need to recognize the interpretative
impact of paratext, and react accordingly. If the editors and
readers of printed and online editions of the Constitution feel like
paratext gets in the way, it should generally be minimized. If we
think the edition-specific paratext twists or distorts what should
be a common-ground document, then the paratext should be
standardized (like the text itself). If we think that the paratext is
essential to our understanding of this two-century-old document,
then we should celebrate and expand its role in editions of the
Constitution. We can, for instance, release the paratext from the
odd bracket or footnote, and print the Constitution similarly to
most modern editions of Shakespeare: with the original (relatively
untouched) text on one page, and lots of paratext (notes,
definitions, history) on the facing page.
To continue the Shakespeare metaphor for a moment: It is
clear that the “irrelevant” clauses are less important than the
legally-active clauses in the text, like the Commerce or Equal
Protection Clauses. It is similarly clear that Hamlet, or Macbeth is
more important than, say, the Merry Wives of Windsor or Timon
of Athens. But at the margin, do we need another production of
Hamlet, or can we take at least one look at Timon? In discussing
the Attestation Clause, a prime example of paratext, Akhil Amar
has noted that “the Supreme Court has never quoted this clause .
. . and many constitutional experts have literally never given the
clause a moment’s thought.”166 These clauses surely deserve at
least a moment’s thought—indeed, they deserve much more.
165. Much of this textual-historical research is currently being done by originalist
scholars, but one need not be an originalist to be interested in minimized clauses. An
originalist would feel that the meaning of a given clause is “fixed” at the moment of its
ratification, and that current judges are “constrained” by that meaning. See, e.g., Lawrence
B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015); Lawrence B. Solum,
The Constraint Principle (draft as of Apr. 3, 2019), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940215. A non-originalist can still be interested in knowing an
earlier, alternative, or enlarged meaning of a phrase. The non-originalist is not bound to
this older, larger meaning, but can choose whether or not the law would be better served
by that expanded meaning.
166. AMAR, supra note 23, at 83.

1 - BECK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

THE PARTS WE SKIP

7/11/19 6:34 PM

261

So what should Congress have done in 2011? If they really
insisted on demonstrating that some parts of the Constitution
have been superseded, that some parts are without legal force,
that some parts are “constitutionally irrelevant,” then they should
have gone a lot further. They should have cut the ratification
dates, the interlinear notes, the 1808 clauses, and the ratification
instructions. They should have cut the signatories and the
preamble to the Bill of Rights. They should have changed “male”
and “twenty-one” to “male and female” and “eighteen.” They
should have added a caveat to the direct tax clause, explaining
that the Sixteenth Amendment allowed for an income tax.
Perhaps they should have cut the Preamble—after all, it is not part
of the Constitution as it “operates today”—at least not in terms
of legally-forceful provisions. Or, even better, they should just
have read the document unedited. James Madison lost that debate
in 1789. Deciding what is relevant, and what is irrelevant, is a
difficult business—even with a taxonomy.

